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A Lay Person’s Guide to Church-State Law 
That Godless Court? Supreme Court Decisions  
on Church-State Relationships 
by Ronald B. Flowers 
Westminster John Knox Press (1994) 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
That Godless Court?, by Ronald B. Flowers, presents the 
history of church-state relations in the United States through 
the use of Supreme Court decisions. Defending his position as a 
strict separationist in the area he refers to as the “relationships 
between religion and civil authority,” Flowers is quick to point 
out that “[s]trict separation is not hostile to religion . . . but will 
provide the best conditions for religions to flourish . . . and 
[will] maximize the free exercise of religion.”1 Flowers asserts 
that the church-state debate should not focus on whether the 
government can or should interfere with individual religious 
actions, but rather on what level of governmental interference 
is justified in preventing or limiting religious freedom.2 
This Book Review examines, in particular, Flowers’s advo-
cacy of the use of the compelling state interest test and the Re-
ligious Freedom Restoration Act to reconcile church-state rela-
tionships and concludes that his discussion fails to consider 
several key arguments which show that these concepts lack 
constitutional foundation. This Review also concludes that, 
while Flowers’s book provides a practical and helpful overview 
of church-state issues prior to 1993, its lack of substantive 
analysis may misguide those readers who rely on its simplicity. 
 
 1. RONALD B. FLOWERS, THAT GODLESS COURT? SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON 
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS at x (1994). Flowers is a professor of religion and chair 
of the Department of Religion at Texas Christian University in Fort Worth, Texas. 
 2. See id. at 129. 
BAN-FIN.DOC 4/10/00 1:10 PM 
836 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999 
Part I of this Review provides an overview of Flowers’s ap-
proach to the church-state debate and the foundation for his 
views as a strict separationist. Part II then examines Flowers’s 
advocacy of the twice-defunct compelling state interest test3 
and questions his support of the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act4 with some of the key criticisms that have been made 
against it. Part III briefly examines the current status of the 
church-state debate in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
City of Boerne v. Flores.5 
II.  APPROACHING THE CHURCH-STATE DEBATE 
In his introduction, Flowers establishes that his goal in 
That Godless Court? is to educate the clergy and lay people on 
church-state issues through the Supreme Court’s work in this 
area.6 His approach in achieving this goal is quite simple; he 
devotes the majority of his book to succinctly presenting the ex-
tensive historical background of the church-state debate. Keep-
ing in mind that his intended audience is not legally trained, 
Flowers explains the structure of the federal court system as 
well as the process by which the Supreme Court determines the 
cases that it will review in the first chapter.7 He then explains 
the formation of the religion clauses in the First Amendment 
by reflecting on the development of religion in colonial Amer-
ica.8  
At this point in his book, Flowers provides a chronological 
overview of numerous Supreme Court cases and decisions that 
have proven to be pertinent and have contributed to the cur-
rent status of church-state issues in the United States.9 Flow-
ers objectively provides this historical information and consci-
entiously distinguishes between the cases and decisions 
regarding the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and 
those regarding its Establishment Clause. Not until the last 
chapter of his book does Flowers present his own perspectives 
 
 3. Also known as the “Sherbert test” which resulted from Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398 (1963). See infra note 17. The standard was subsequently overturned in 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1989). 
 4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1998). 
 5. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 6. See FLOWERS, supra note 1, at ix. 
 7. See id. at 1-8. 
 8. See id. at 9-19. 
 9. See id. at 19-125. 
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regarding the ongoing church-state debate and provide any in-
sight into the basis for his opinions.10 Perhaps because Flow-
ers’s work is geared toward the clergy and lay people, he falls 
short on substantive analysis and discussion of his position and 
rather long on historical narrative. 
In the final chapter of the book, entitled “Flash Points and 
the Future,” Flowers clearly establishes his position that “the 
maximum amount of religious liberty is consistent with the 
Constitution and best for religious groups and American life  
in general.”11 His analysis encompasses four separate and very 
brief discussions. 
First, he discusses the role that the Christian Right move-
ment has played in the church-state debate and the impact 
that this group has had on that debate and in politics in gen-
eral. Flowers supports much of what the Christian Right has 
done to address the “moral decline of the nation . . . [and] moral 
corruption in every stratum of society,”12 on the belief that 
“[t]he First Amendment was designed to separate church from 
state, not religion from government.”13 Flowers suggests that 
the Christian Right significantly influenced the elections of 
Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush as well as these 
presidents’ subsequent efforts to create and maintain a conser-
vative Supreme Court.14 However, Flowers argues that the po-
litical efforts of the Christian Right essentially defeat the spirit 
of separation, since they are attempting to “remake the country 
in [their] own [moral and religious] image”15 in violation of Ar-
ticle VI of the Constitution.16 
Next, Flowers addresses what he views as the appropriate 
response to the issue presented in the Introduction, specifi-
cally, the ideal level of interference the government should 
have in religious action and when that interference is war-
ranted. Flowers proposes that the compelling state interest test 
that resulted from the Supreme Court’s decision in Sherbert v. 
Verner17 is the best approach to resolving this issue. In support-
 
 10. See id. at 126-45 
 11. Id. at 126. 
 12. Id. at 127. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See id. at 128. 
 15. Id. at 127. 
 16. See id. at 127-28. 
 17. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The Sherbert test essentially balances the government’s 
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ing this approach, he attacks the merits of the Court’s decision 
in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of 
Oregon v. Smith,18 which subsequently abolished the compel-
ling state interest test.19 Flowers views the demise of this test 
as having a detrimental effect on an individual’s right to be 
free from governmental restraints on religious exercise.20 Fi-
nally, he touches on the merits of the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act as a legislative response to the Smith decision and 
touts it as the law that makes “[r]eligious liberty . . . presuma-
bly secure again.”21 
Flowers then discusses what he views as the appropriate 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause in the church-state 
debate.22 He rejects the “original intent” approach taken by ac-
commodationists and favors a position that presupposes a lim-
ited government. Flowers asserts that “the attempt to discern 
the intent of the authors of the First Amendment . . . is 
flawed”23 and suggests that “the principle behind the Estab-
lishment Clause that must be applied . . . is that the govern-
ment should refrain from extending itself into religion, neither 
hindering it nor aiding it, even if that aid can be given in a 
nondiscriminatory, evenhanded way.”24 
Flowers concludes with a review of recent cases and discusses 
the problems that can arise when government aids religion. First, 
he asserts that when government gets involved with religious in-
stitutions by giving them money, the inevitable result is that the 
government will also control or supervise that institution.25 Sec-
ond, he suggests that when religious groups ask for government 
assistance, they trivialize their beliefs by formulating secular rea-
sons to justify receiving assistance.26 Third, Flowers states that 
 
interest for abolishing the religious activity at issue against the religious individual’s 
interest in maintaining the activity through a series of questions. Flowers outlines this 
test in chapter four of his book. See id. at 30-32. 
 18. 494 U.S. 872 (1989). 
 19. See id. 
 20. See FLOWERS, supra note 1, at 130-33. 
 21. Id. at 133. 
 21.  See id. at 133-38.  
 23. Id. at 134. 
 24. Id. at 135. 
 25. See id. at 138. 
 26. See id. at 139. See Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); 
Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
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accommodationists ignore the fact that “every taxpayer is conse-
quently required to pay for what he or she does not believe”27 
when the government funds religious activities with public money. 
Finally, Flowers again asserts that strict separation is not hostile 
to religion, but that it is necessary to allow religions to grow based 
on their respective principles and beliefs, without being dependent 
on the whims of the government.28 
III.  THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT: A HASTY 
RESPONSE TO SMITH 
In Smith, the Supreme Court essentially abolished the 
compelling state interest test29 when it held that Oregon’s law, 
which prohibited the use of peyote in religious ceremonies of 
the Native American Church, did not violate the Free Exercise 
Clause.30 The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does 
not exempt individuals from complying with “a ‘valid and neu-
tral law of general applicability on the ground that the law pro-
scribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or 
proscribes).’ ”31 According to Flowers, the Smith decision disre-
garded the burden that certain individuals may encounter 
when carrying out their religious beliefs and, therefore, had 
 
 27. FLOWERS, supra note 1, at 141. 
 28. See id. at 143. 
 29. The compelling state interest, or “Sherbert,” test was set forth in Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Sherbert involved an employee who sued for unemploy-
ment compensation benefits after being discharged by her employer for refusing to 
work Saturdays based on her beliefs as a Seventh-Day Adventist. The Court held that 
the state “may not constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions so as to constrain a 
worker to abandon his religious convictions respecting the day of rest.” Sherbert, 374 
U.S. at 410. The Court stated that to “withstand [the employee’s] constitutional chal-
lenge,” the state had to show that: 
[Sherbert’s] disqualification as a beneficiary represent[ed] no infringement by the 
State of her constitutional rights of free exercise, or . . . any incidental burden on 
the free exercise of [the employee’s] religion [was] justified by a “compelling state 
interest in the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power to 
regulate.” 
Id. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). 
The Court further articulated that the “compelling state interest” must not just 
be a mere showing “of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest [but that] 
in this highly sensitive constitutional area, ‘(o)nly the gravest abuses, endangering 
paramount interest, give occasion for permissible limitation.’ ” Id. at 406 (quoting 
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). 
 30. See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-
90 (1989). 
 31. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 
(1982)). 
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highly “disastrous effects on religious freedom.”32 From the per-
spectives of Flowers and other strict separationists, Smith 
might as well have denounced the Free Exercise Clause itself. 
In November of 1993, partly in response to the great dissat-
isfaction with the Court’s holding in Smith, Congress enacted 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Essentially, 
RFRA legislatively reinstated the compelling state interest test 
that the Court eliminated in Smith. The purpose of RFRA was 
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in 
Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder and to guar-
antee its application in all cases where free exercise of 
religion is substantially burdened; and (2) to provide a 
claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is 
substantially burdened by government.33 
When RFRA was introduced in Congress, Flowers thought 
it was ironic that “the American people would have to petition 
Congress to restore what the founders of the country thought 
they had guaranteed through the Free Exercise Clause.”34 Al-
though it is clear from Flowers’s book that he supports RFRA 
wholeheartedly, he fails to discuss at any length the motivation 
behind his support. The only basis that he offers as to why he 
believes RFRA is good for religion is that RFRA will allow gov-
ernments at all levels to interfere with individuals’ religious 
practices only when there is “a legitimate public-good interest 
of great importance that could be accomplished in no other 
way.”35 
Although Flowers published his book several years prior to 
the RFRA’s demise in City of Boerne v. Flores,36 he should have 
still considered in greater depth the criticisms of RFRA in his 
discussion. In weighing the potential benefits of RFRA, Flowers 
should have weighed the potential drawbacks and problems 
that such legislation could impose as well. By failing to do so, 
Flowers’s brief support of RFRA proves to be problematic and 
flawed in the end. 
Contrary to the separationists’ belief that RFRA would 
make religious liberty secure again, RFRA ultimately proved to 
 
 32. FLOWERS, supra note 1, at 130, 133. 
 33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1)-(2) (citations omitted). 
 34. FLOWERS, supra note 1, at 133. 
 35. Id. 
 36. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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be a hasty response that created new problems. Since RFRA 
was directed at putting bite back into the Free Exercise Clause 
by restricting state interference with individuals’ actions under 
the clause, supporters of RFRA mistakenly believed that it was 
constitutionally mandated. However, when the Supreme Court 
decided Smith, it mentioned that although the legislature can 
make exceptions in generally applicable laws for certain reli-
gious practices, such exceptions are not required by the Free 
Exercise Clause.37 Further, critics of RFRA have asserted that 
it is unconstitutional on three separate grounds: first, RFRA 
gives religious groups more constitutional latitude than was in-
tended by the Constitution; second, RFRA poses federalism 
problems; and third, Congress overstepped its constitutional 
bounds by enacting RFRA, thereby undermining the judgment 
and credibility of the Court.38 
Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager illustrate 
the first problem with the RFRA by pointing out that accom-
modating religions under the Constitution does not require “the 
state to confer privileges upon religious believers indiscrimi-
nately.”39 To allow religious individuals exemption from all 
laws of general applicability that may interfere with their reli-
gious activities would favor these individuals above non-
religious individuals. Such favoritism seems to defeat the spirit 
of the Constitution. Kevin F. O’Shea likewise suggests that 
“[n]eutral treatment should be the goal, even if religious ex-
pression is incidentally burdened in the process.”40 
The second problem raised by RFRA is that of federalism. 
When the Supreme Court decided Smith, it provided that 
states could protect certain religious practices affected by laws 
of general applicability through state exceptions. However, 
when Congress enacted RFRA, it essentially precluded states 
from deciding how best to accommodate, if at all, the religious 
 
 37. See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 
(1989). 
 38. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1994). See also Ira C. 
Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 575 (1998) (“[L]egislative 
codification of religious liberty, RFRA-style, is ill-advised. . . .”); Kevin F. O’Shea, Rec-
onciling the Religion Clauses, 75 MICH. B.J. 1146, 1146 (1996) (noting that RFRA has 
been criticized as undermining judicial power and has been disregarded by most 
courts). 
 39. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 38, at 453. 
 40. O’Shea, supra note 38, at 1148. 
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practices of its citizens.41 As a result, RFRA removes account-
ability from the federal level and places it squarely upon the 
state governments to take responsibility for a federal statute 
that fails to take into consideration the interests and needs of 
their citizens.42 In addition, critics argue that Congress ex-
ceeded the scope of power granted by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment when it enacted RFRA.43 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, RFRA questions the 
integrity of the Supreme Court as well as judicial authority 
under the Constitution. It has been recognized and oft repeated 
that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.”44 When Congress enacted 
RFRA to reinstate the compelling state interest test, it at-
tempted to overturn the Court’s decision in Smith with one fell 
legislative swoop. “By demanding that the Court use constitu-
tional concepts according to statutory instruction, Congress in-
terferes with the judiciary’s authority and obligation to develop 
an autonomous jurisprudence.”45 This action by Congress de-
feated the ideal of separation of power among the three 
branches of the government as created by the Constitution and 
tips the power significantly toward Congress. The Court spe-
cifically stated that its refusal to broaden the application of the 
compelling state interest test was based on its unworkable 
structure outside of its original scope.46 It is the Court’s respon-
sibility to interpret the Constitution and clarify constitutional 
rights to which individuals are entitled. Through this judicial 
process, the Court provides the guidance necessary for lower 
courts to reach consistent and predictable results in similar 
cases. In enacting RFRA, Congress showed an extreme lack of 
deference to the Court and the Constitution and “impermissibly 
attempted to specify a ‘rule of decision’ for the courts.”47 
 
 41. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 38, at 466. 
 42. See id. at 467. 
 43. See id. at 461 (“The fourteenth amendment’s enforcement clause is not . . . a 
blank check empowering Congress to pass any legislation connected to liberty or citi-
zenship.”). See also Lupu, supra note 34, at 577-85 (suggesting that RFRA’s reliance on 
the Fourteenth Amendment was not well-substantiated). 
 44. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 45. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 38, at 470. 
 46. See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882-
90 (1989). 
 47. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 38, at 470. 
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IV.  THE EFFECT OF BOERNE ON RFRA AND THE CHURCH-STATE 
DEBATE 
City of Boerne v. Flores,48 decided by the Supreme Court in 
1997, subsequently undermined Flowers’s position regarding 
RFRA and illustrates his failure to address important concerns 
in his defense of RFRA. In Boerne, the Supreme Court held 
that RFRA exceeded the scope of congressional authority 
granted in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.49 In 
Boerne, the Archbishop of St. Peter Catholic Church in Boerne, 
Texas, was denied a permit to enlarge the church building be-
cause of the city’s zoning ordinances regarding historical land-
marks.50 The Archbishop relied on RFRA and challenged the 
zoning ordinance, claiming that it was “a proper exercise of 
Congress’ remedial or preventive power.”51 However, the Court 
held that “RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial 
or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive 
to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It ap-
pears, instead, to attempt a substantive change in constitu-
tional protections.”52 The Court emphasized the precedent set 
in Marbury v. Madison53 that it is the Court’s duty to determine 
whether an act of Congress has exceeded its constitutional 
scope, concluding that Congress had indeed exceeded the limits 
of its power in this situation.54 
Flowers’s position with regard to RFRA is more consistent 
with the analysis set forth by Justice O’Connor’s dissent in 
Boerne. Like Flowers, Justice O’Connor believed that the 
Court’s opinion in Smith was “an improper standard for decid-
ing free exercise claims.”55 Justice O’Connor stated that the 
Free Exercise Clause is not simply an antidiscrimination prin-
ciple that protects only against those laws that single out reli-
gious practice for unfavorable treatment. “Rather, the Clause is 
best understood as an affirmative guarantee of the right to par-
ticipate in religious practices and conduct without impermissi-
ble governmental interference, even when such conduct con-
 
 48. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  
 49. See id. at 529-36. 
 50. See id. at 511-12. 
 51. Id. at 529. 
 52. Id. at 532. 
 53. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 54. See id. at 536. 
 55. Id. at 546 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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flicts with a neutral, generally applicable law.”56 
Although Flowers argues that RFRA would be an ideal pre-
ventive and remedial measure against burdensome governmen-
tal interference on an individual’s exercise of religious beliefs, 
he fails to admit that such an act has the potential to extend 
far beyond its intended reach. The Court in Boerne addressed 
this particular problem when it pointed out that the RFRA es-
sentially allows individuals to challenge any law that imposes a 
burden on some aspect of their religious exercise, but that such 
claims will be difficult for states to contest.57 Based on Flow-
ers’s arguments, one might surmise that Boerne would have 
been an ideal situation within which to reexamine the Court’s 
holding in Smith in favor of reinstating the compelling state in-
terest test. However, the Court obviously did not believe this 
was necessary and upheld its decision from Smith by ruling 
that RFRA was unconstitutional. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As a result of Boerne, courts are once again left to decide 
Free Exercise Clause cases based on the precedents set by the 
Supreme Court, rather than according to legislative mandate. 
However, eliminating RFRA and reinstating the standard, or 
the lack thereof, from Smith, does not lay the church-state de-
bate to rest for good. Although RFRA failed to achieve its goal, 
Smith was not faultless. In fact, Smith demands almost no 
scrutiny by the courts when considering challenges to laws con-
flicting with the exercise of certain religious activities. As a re-
sult, courts have wide discretion in making their decisions. 
With regard to the future of the church-state debate in light of 
Smith and RFRA, 
two bad ideas do not make a good one. Neither Smith nor the 
RFRA adequately addresses the significance of the constitu-
 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. at 533-34. The Court also noted: 
RFRA’s substantial burden test, however, is not even a discriminatory effects 
or disparate impact test. It is a reality of the modern regulatory state that 
numerous state laws, such as the zoning regulation at issue here, imposes a 
substantial burden on a large class of individuals. When the exercise of relig-
ion has been burdened in an incidental way by a law of general application, it 
does not follow that the persons affected have been burdened any more than 
other citizens, let alone burdened because of their religious beliefs. 
Id. at 535. 
BAN-FIN.DOC 4/10/00 1:10 PM 
835] BOOK REVIEW: THAT GODLESS COURT? 845 
tional text. Nor does either of them reflect a realistic assess-
ment of how law actually functions and develops. . . . [E]fforts 
to establish a contextual meaning are bound to fail. Over 
time, both Smith and the RFRA will be constructed away as 
text, fact, and policy collide. . . .58 
In conclusion, That Godless Court? presents an in-depth 
look into the history and status of the church-state debate in 
the United States and establishes, at least for lay people and 
clergy, a practical foundation from which to delve further into 
the debate. Flowers provides only a cursory analysis of the key 
arguments surrounding church-state issues, however, and 
leaves out some important issues in this area. As a result, 
readers who seek a comprehensive overview of church-state is-
sues may potentially be misled by the unbalanced and selective 





 58. Allan Ides, The Text of the Free Exercise Clause as a Measure of Employment 
Division v. Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
135, 155 (1994). 
